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Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and the
Uphill Battle Facing Native American
Religion on Public Lands
Charlton H. Bonham*
It's a place where the Shoshones go up and obtain songs from
this mountain. When they go fasting over there, they obtain
songs, the songs given to them at this place for Sun Dance,
Peyote, or whatever they are seeking. So, to us it is holy
ground. We respect it. We walk in with respect and walk
away from it with respect. It's a holy place to us, very sacred.'
I.

Introduction

Devils Tower National Monument, located in northeastern
Wyoming, is an unparalleled natural phenomenon with great
historical and religious significance. Named the first national
monument in 1906,2 the Tower attracts scores of recreational
Native
visitors and Native American religious worshipers.
American Indian tribes, 3 including the Cheyenne River Sioux,
. J.D. and Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resource Law 2000,
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. B.B.A. 1990, University of
Georgia. California Staff Attorney, Trout Unlimited, Inc., the Nation's leading
native coldwater trout and salmon conservation organization. The author wishes to
thank the Journal of Law and Inequality for its editorial assistance and patience.
1. Jeffery R. Hanson & David Moore, Applied Anthropology at Devils Tower
National Monument, 44 PLAINS ANTHROPOLOGIST: MEMOIR 31, at 57 (1999)

(quoting from June 1992 interview with Eastern Shoshone tribe spiritual
representative to the Medicine Wheel Coalition).
2. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt employed the newly-enacted
Antiquities Act and designated Devils Tower the country's first national
monument. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819 (10th
Cir. 1999) (citing Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (1906)), cert. denied, 529 U.S.
1037 (2000). The Proclamation noted that the Tower is "a natural wonder and an
object of historic and great scientific interest ... [and] warning is hereby given to
all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure or destroy any feature of the
natural tower." Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236, 3237 (1906). See also Joel
Brady, '7and Is Itself a Sacred, Living Being": Native American Sacred Site
Protection on Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 153, 165 (2000) (describing in brief the history and cultural
significance of Devils Tower).
3. This Article considers the terms "Native American" and "Indian" to be
interchangeable, but predominantly employs the term "Native American" for
consistency.
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Arapahoe, Crow, Kiowa, Lakota Sioux, and Eastern Shoshone, 4
know Devils Tower as Mato Tipila or He Hota Paha. 5 For the
tribes, the Tower is a sacred site where, according to religious
legend, seven sisters took refuge from a pursuing bear. 6 Stranded,
the sisters died and ascended into the sky, forming the Big
Dipper's stars, 7 For non-Native Americans, however, Devils Tower
is primarily considered a world-class rock climbing location.8
Devils Tower is-literally and figuratively-stuck between a
rock and a hard place. Native American tribes, the National Park
Service (NPS), 9 and rock climbers each have differing views on
acceptable management plans, schedules, and actions for the
Tower. 10 More importantly, the tribes and the rock climbers

4. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816 n.3.
5. See id. at 816 n.2. The various religious and culturally significant Native
American names mean Bear Lodge, Bear's Tipi, Bear's House, or Grey Horn Butte.
See id. The Devils Tower name derives from a scientific expedition to the area,
which took place in violation of Indian treaty rights. See Brady, supra note 2, at
165. The scientific community believes Devils Tower to be the neck of an extinct
volcano. See Lloyd Burton & David Ruppert, Bear's Lodge or Devils Tower. InterCultural Relations, Legal-Pluralism,and the Management of Sacred Sites on Public
Lands, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 201, 201-02 (1999) (citing Greg Burton, A Day
at Devils Tower, in NAT'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEVILS TOWER
(1984) (Handbook 111 of the NPS Handbook series introducing various national
parks and monuments)).
6. See Brady, supra note 2, at 165; see also Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at
201 (recounting the tribes' explanation for the origin of Devils Tower).
7. See Brady, supra note 2, at 165; see also Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at
201 (recounting the tribes' explanation for the origin of Devils Tower).
8. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 53. For example, after interviewing
fifty-eight climbers and reviewing the climber registry cards during the 1991
climbing season, the authors determined that seventy-four percent of Devils Tower
climbers drove over six hours to climb at the Monument. See id. at 58. The
number of climbers visiting Devils Tower has increased substantially over the last
century. See id. at 54. In 1991, the Tower was climbed more than 5000 times. See
id. Compare that figure to the period between 1938 and 1950, during which an
estimated ten parties reached the summit of the rock. See id.; see also Bear Lodge
Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1449 n.1 (D. Wyo. 1998) (stating
As recreation in
that approximately 6000 climbers visit the site annually).
general-and rock climbing in particular-increases in popularity, more climbers can
be expected to visit Devils Tower.
9. The U.S. National Park Service is the federal public lands management
agency with administrative control over Devils Tower National Monument. See
Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819. The NPS's administrative control over the Monument
began in 1916. See id.
10. For example, "the most sacred religious artifact of the Sioux people is the
White Buffalo Calf Pipe, given to them by White Buffalo Calf Woman at the
beginning of creation when she emerged from Devils Tower." Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d
at 816. Tribal religious leaders have consistently advocated that the National Park
Service should restrict, if not prohibit, climbing. See Hanson & Moore, supra note
1, at 59. On the other hand, sixty-seven percent of climbers interviewed during the
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advocate uses of the Tower that are in direct conflict. One group
wants to climb the Tower; another wants the climbing to stop."
The Devils Tower conflict implicates constitutional
provisions, federal statutes, case law, and executive orders. 12 To
understand the Devils Tower conflict, one must understand the
14
13
First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978,15 the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,16 certain U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, 17 and the Clinton Administration's 1996
Executive Order 13,007.18 This order requires federal agencies to
"accommodate access to and ceremonial use of' sacred sites and to
"avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity" of those sites. 19
Recently, the Wyoming federal district court and the Tenth
Circuit addressed the Devils Tower conflict. 20 In 1996, the Federal
District Court for the District of Wyoming determined that
portions of the NPS's 1995 Final Climbing Management Plan
1992 climbing season indicated that "knowledge of Native American concerns about
climbing would not change their own views about climbing Devils Tower in the
future." Id. Beyond its program of climbing closures, whether voluntary or
mandatory, the NPS also implemented a program whereby climbers cannot place
any new climbing bolts into the Tower. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819 (citing ROCKY
MOUNTAIN REGION, NA'L PARK SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL
Climbers characterize
CLIMBING MANAGEMENT PLAN 24-25 (1995) (FCMP)).
themselves as either sport or free climbers. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at
59. Sport climbers rely on bolted protection placed permanently into the rock
See id. Free climbers, or traditional climbers, place
during their ascent.
removable, generally passive, protection pieces into the rock while climbing. See id.
11. There is only one resource: the Tower. Climbers want to climb there and
tribal members want to worship and conduct ceremonies at the site. Climbing
affects both the physical characteristics of the rock and the "spiritual life and
practices of American Indians." Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 815.
12. See infra notes 44-124 and accompanying text.
13. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause reads, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
14. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment bars Congress from
making any laws "prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Thus, the First Amendment guarantees the free practice of religion and prohibits
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
religion.
government-supported
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1155-57 (2nd ed. 1988).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
17. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the Forest Service
from allowing logging and construction on lands traditionally deemed sacred by
three Native American tribes).
18. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
19. Id.
20. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo.
1998), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
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(FCMP) for Devils Tower National Monument violated the
Establishment Clause. 21 The court found a violation because the
FCMP's mandatory ban on climbing during the month of June for
the benefit of tribal religious practices was-as the commercial and
private climber plaintiffs argued-a "subsidy of the Indian
religion." 22 Subsequently, the NPS revised the FCMP.23 After the
NPS changed the plan's prohibition on climbing to a voluntary
climbing closure, the district court ruled the commercial climbing
ban issue moot, 24 and concluded that a voluntary ban in the FCMP
does not violate the Establishment Clause. 25 Failing to reach the
merits of the plaintiffs' claim, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in 1999
the district court decision on standing grounds. 26 In March 2000,
27
the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The district court decision, however, will most likely not be
the last time a federal court will evaluate a conflict between
resource user groups on public lands and balance the interests of
Native American religious activities against recreation interests
and federal land management agency decisions. 28 In fact, the
plaintiff attorneys in Bear Lodge29 recently pursued litigation
21. See Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the
Crossroads: The National Park Service and the Preservationof Native American
CulturalResources in the 21st Century, 18 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 5, 27
(1997) (citing Complaint in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, Civ. No. 96CV-063-D (D. Wyo. June 8, 1996)).
22. Id.
23. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170-71.
24. See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1452.
25. See id. at 1456-57.
26. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 822. Although plaintiffs failed on standing
grounds, the legal question is still live. Artful pleading, better facts showing injury
from agency management decision, or any combination of the two should result in
judicial review on the merits.
27. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
28. The Tenth Circuit has unquestionably drawn a "line demarcating
impermissible accommodation in the area of public lands ruling that the '[e]xercise
of First Amendment freedoms may not be asserted to deprive the public of its
normal use of an area."' Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1455 (quoting Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980)). As the Bear Lodge district court
noted, the "record clearly reveals that climbing. at the Devils Tower National
Monument is a 'legitimate recreational and historic' use of Park Service lands." Id.
(quoting FCMP at 2). Because the Supreme Court has yet to conclusively address
the issue of public lands management, the Establishment Clause, and Native
American religious practices, many commentators hope that the Court will accept
certiorari of an appropriate case. See Brady, supra note 2, at 172-73.
29. Plaintiffs in Bear Lodge included a commercial climbing operator and
several recreational climbers. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816 n.1. The Mountain
States Legal Foundation (MSLF) represented the Bear Lodge plaintiffs. See id. at
815.

20021

NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION ON PUBLIC LANDS 161

30
In the
concerning Rainbow Bridge National Monument in Utah.
Rainbow Bridge case, plaintiffs similarly alleged that the Park
Service's attempt at a voluntary ban to promote respect for Navajo
31
religious activities violates the Establishment Clause.
Beyond these legislative and judicial considerations, the
principle of competitive exclusion and the doctrine of discovery
present more challenging obstacles to the advancement of Native
American religion on public lands. When ideological conflicts and
differences separate two resource user groups, the ecological
principle of competitive exclusion states that one group will
exclude the other from access to that resource. 32 A key triggering
characteristic of the principle's exclusionary effect is competition
over a scarce resource. 33 Due to the increase of recreation on
public lands, use of those lands often involves a struggle over

access.

34

The history of exclusion of Native American tribes, however,
is not limited to examples involving the competitive exclusion
principle. Instead, this history began with America's acquisition of
territory through discovery. 35 The doctrine of discovery aided the
30. On March 3, 2000, the MSLF filed the Rainbow Bridge complaint. See
at
LIBERTIES,
FOUND.,
CONSTITUTIONAL
MOUNTAIN
STATES
LEGAL
(last visited Apr. 17,
http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal-cases-home.cfm
2002). Judgment by the Utah federal district court was entered on April 9, 2002.
See UTAH DISTRICT COURT, CIVIL CASES WITH RECENT JUDGMENTS,
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/reports/judgment.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
The court dismissed the First Amendment claim for failure to properly join
defendants. See Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, No. 2:00 cv 191J (D.
2002),
9,
Apr.
Utah
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/reports/tifs/2-OOcvOO191_00000044.tif. MSLF intends
to appeal this decision to the Tenth Circuit. See MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUND.,
supra.
31. See infra notes 270-273 and accompanying text.
32. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 59 (suggesting that the data collected
during field studies of climbers and Native Americans at the Tower could "be
approached from the ecological principle of competitive exclusion").
33. See infra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 290-312 and accompanying text.
35. The doctrine of discovery provides "that discovery gave title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all
other ... governments, which title might be consummated by possession." Johnson
v.McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). Indian law scholars note that
"Johnsonhas spawned a cottage industry among legal scholars on the 'meanings' of
the decision." DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 70 (4th ed. 1998).
Some commentators have suggested that the doctrine of discovery did not greatly
affect tribes. See Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 25-26 (1987). Others argue that the doctrine's acceptance in
North America dramatically altered the tribes' status with the land, and that the
doctrine allowed colonization to "legitimate, energize, and constrain as needed
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settlement of the original thirteen colonies, and contributed
greatly to the nation's eventual expansion westward. 36 Today, the
doctrine is relevant to conflicts between recreationalists and
Native Americans over sacred sites on public lands. At Devils
Tower National Monument, many climbers believe that their
recreational use of the Tower does not infringe or impede the
tribes' religious practices.3 7 Like their forefathers in discovery,
Devils Tower climbers often express the belief that "they"
38
discovered the resource.
Much scholarly analysis exists on the Devils Tower conflict,
centering largely on the Bear Lodge decisions and the
constitutional issues implicated. This Article, however, argues
that regardless of the resolution of these important legal issues,
the realistic ramifications of the principle of competitive exclusion
and the doctrine of discovery may lead to the limitation and
diminishment of tribal access to sacred sites and decreased
protection of their religious practices. Competitive exclusion and
the discovery doctrine are applicable to these conflicts on public
lands because the conflicts consistently involve ideological
differences, scarce resources, and traditional Western-centric rules
39
of law.
This Article begins with a brief overview in Section II of the
constitutional provisions, statutory directives,
and other
legislative and executive means applicable to ensure Native
white society's will to empire over the North American continent." ROBERT A.
WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 316-17, 325-26 (1990). More emphatically, Professor
Williams concluded that "Johnson's acceptance of the Doctrine of Discovery into
United States law preserved the legacy of 1,000 years of European racism and
colonialism directed against non-Western peoples." Id. at 317.
36. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh legitimized "the
right of the United States government to 'extinguish' Indian title." Ali Friedberg,
Reconsideringthe Doctrine of Discovery: Spanish Land Acquisition in Mexico (15211821), 17 WIS. INT'L L.J. 87, 104 (1999). If the U.S. government had not been able
to self-legalize its physical taking of Native American lands, the expansion west
would have been more difficult. "By denying the Indians' ownership rights in their
lands and reducing their status from 'true owners' to 'occupants'," Marshall
facilitated "practical, utilitarian concerns for the acquisition of land." Id. at 107-08.
37. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 59.
38. See id. (noting that climbers "perceived Devils Tower as public property");
infra notes 176-177 and accompanying text. Federal courts have determined that
"[a]ny aboriginal proprietary interest that the [Indians] may have held in this land
would have been extinguished by the entry of the white man in earlier years."
Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Utah 1977) (Navajo challenge to
inundation of the Glen Canyon area in Colorado).
39. These factors are present in the Devils Tower conflict and are clearly seen
in the pending Rainbow Bridge litigation.
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American religious freedom on public lands and protection of
Native American sacred sites found on public lands. 40 This
Section also discusses the tension inherent in the Constitution's
religion clauses. Section III describes the Devils Tower conflict
from the tribes', climbers', and NPS's perspectives. 41 Section IV
discusses the district court and Tenth Circuit's Bear Lodge
decisions, analyzes the current Rainbow Bridge controversy, and
then applies the Bear Lodge decisions to the Rainbow Bridge
controversy. 42 This Section argues that the legal outcome of both
cases will be similar. Section V details the principle of competitive
43
exclusion and provides an overview of the doctrine of discovery.
Section V argues that because of these two concepts,
recreationalism on public lands may prevail over preservation of
Native American religious practices and sacred sites. This Article
concludes that, realistically, the principle of competitive exclusion
and the doctrine of discovery predetermine the outcome of the
conflict between Native American religious practices, federal land
management decisions, and recreation on public lands; unless both
the law and society change, Native American religious freedom
may ultimately lose.
II. The American Legal System's Conflicted Structure for
Balancing Native American Religion and Interests on
Public Lands
Within the lifetime of many Native Americans alive today,
the U.S. government pursued a policy designed to suppress
traditional Native American religious and cultural practices and
ceremonies. 44 The American legal system struggles to balance the
need for accommodating Native American religions, where religion
See infra notes 44-124 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-197 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 198-288 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 289-344 and accompanying text.
44. See FELIX COHEN, OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
In 1921, the U.S.
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 175 n.347 (1942).
Commissioner of Indian Affairs announced:
The sun-dance, and all other similar dances and so-called religious
ceremonies are considered "Indian Offences" under existing regulations,
and corrective penalties are provided. I regard such restrictions as
applicable to any [religious] dance which involves ... the reckless giving
away of property ... frequent or prolonged periods of celebration ... in
fact any disorderly or plainly excessive performance that promotes
superstitious cruelty, licentiousness, idleness, danger to health, and
shiftless indifference to family welfare.
Id. (quoting the Commissioner).
40.
41.
42.
43.
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and culture are often indistinguishable, with the primary objective
of keeping "church and state" separate. 45 Federal statutes, such as
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA)46 and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),47 as well as executive
orders 48 attempt to strike that appropriate legal balance. The
First Amendment, however, inhibits this balancing because of the
inherent conflict between allowing the free exercise of religion and
49
prohibiting the establishment of religion.
A.

The First Amendment

1. The Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause provides that "Congress shall make
no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion.5 0 Generally,
the Free Exercise Clause forbids governmental interference with
religious practices. 5' Yet, barring a finding that the government
affirmatively "coerced or penalized" one particular religious group
because of that group's beliefs, government interference with the
52
free exercise of religion is permissible.
The leading Supreme Court case on Native American religion
on public lands and the Free Exercise Clause is Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n. 53 In Lyng, the U.S. Forest
Service attempted to complete a logging road through the Six
Rivers National Forest in northwestern California despite three
Native American tribes' religious use of the area. 54 According to
45. See GETCHES ET AL., supra note 35, at 754-55.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
47. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
48. E.g., Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, § l(a) (May 24, 1996).
49. The First Amendment contains both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Government can accommodate religious practices
to "prevent a free exercise violation, but it must be something less than the
establishment of religion." Lydia T. Grimm, Sacred Lands and the Establishment
Clause: Indian Religious Practiceson Federal Lands, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT
19, 21 (1997).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 19.
52. Ann M. Hooker, American Indian Sacred Sites on Federal Public Lands:
Resolving Conflicts Between Religious Use and Multiple Use at El Malpais National
Monument, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 133, 137-38 n.42 (1994) (concluding that "[t]he
penalty or coercion theory was developed in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), and
applied to sacred site cases in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439 (1988)").
53. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
54. See id. at 441-42.
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the Court, the question presented was whether the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibited construction of the
road. 55 The Court concluded that it did not because the road
56
would not coerce the tribes into violating their religious beliefs.
The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's earlier determination that
57
the Forest Service road would violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The decision in Lyng effectively marked the end of Native
American attempts to employ the Free Exercise Clause to protect
Native American religious sites on public lands because 5it8
established the demanding "coerced or penalized" standard.
Thus, despite the language of the Free Exercise Clause prohibiting
governmental interference with religious practices, tribes have
been unsuccessful in challenging government actions that harmed
tribal sacred sites, which thereby interfered with tribal religious
practices. 59
Government cannot, of course, intentionally discriminate
against religious practices. 60 However, governmental actions that
incidentally prohibit free exercise as the result of a neutral,
"generally applicable law" will not violate the First Amendment's
Free Exercise Clause. 61 It is some assurance that if a law is not
generally applicable and an agency explicitly excludes Native
American religion, then some relief may be available. But the
more likely dynamic is diminishment of Native American religious
freedom via neutral and generally applicable laws without express
agency targeting-a situation where little or no Free Exercise relief
exists.
55. See id. at 441.
56. See id. at 468. In Lyng, the Court referred to its earlier Bowen decision,
where parents of a child argued that using a Social Security number to identify the
child would interfere with their religious beliefs, and applied the Bowen reasoning
to determine that "[i]n neither [Bowen or Lyng], however, would the affected
individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious
beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other
citizens." Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449 (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. 693).
57. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688
(9th Cir. 1985); Robert J. Miller, Correcting Supreme Court "Errors" American
Indian Response to Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 20
ENvTL. L. 1037, 1051-52 (1990).
58. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 20 (noting that the "Supreme Court dealt the
final blow to Free Exercise claims" in Lyng); Brady, supra note 2, at 161.
59. See Brady, supra note 2, at 159-60.
60. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532-33
(1993).
61. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878
(1990); infra notes 98-105 and accompanying text.
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The Establishment Clause

In the 1980s, Native American efforts to stop federal land
management agency actions that affected sacred tribal lands
centered on the Free Exercise Clause. 62 Now, as federal land
management agencies attempt to accommodate Native American
religious practices and protect sacred sites located on public lands,
courts are faced with the question of whether those agency
accommodations violate the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.63
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from making
laws "respecting an establishment of religion. 64
The
Establishment Clause, therefore, manifests the principle of
separation of church and state. 65
The prohibition on laws
"respecting an establishment of religion" expressly prohibits
governmental endorsement or disapproval of religion. 66 But the
Establishment Clause does not require "callous indifference" to
67
religion.
Establishment Clause analysis generally involves three
steps, 68
which the Supreme Court described in Lemon v.
Kurtzman.69 In short, a secular purpose must be at the core of the
government's action; the effect of the action must primarily be
secular, or it must remain neutral as to religion, neither advancing
nor inhibiting it; and the action must not rise to the level of an
excessive entanglement in religion. 70 More recently, however, the
Court has addressed Establishment cases without applying the
Lemon test.71 Consequently, the proponents of Native American
sacred sites and religious freedom on public lands can never
entirely predict with accuracy the type of test a particular court
62. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 20-21.
63. See id.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
65. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
66. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
67. Id. at 673.
68. See Robert Charles Ward, The Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the
Desecrationand Destruction of Native American Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19
ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 813 n.120 (1992).
69. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Ward, supra note 68, at 814 (describing the
three-part Establishment Clause test); Grimm, supra note 49, at 21 (setting forth
the elements of the three-part Establishment Clause test).
70. See Ward, supra note 68, at 813 n.120; see also Grimm, supra note 49, at 21
(setting forth the elements of the three-part Establishment Clause test).
71. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 21.
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will employ.
3.

72

The Inherent Tension Between the Religion Clauses,
and Its Effect on Native American Religious Freedom
and Sacred Sites on Public Lands

The First Amendment necessarily discusses religion in the
context of law. Yet the constitutional framers considered law and
In fact, the First
religion as mutually non-threatening. 73
Amendment's purpose "was to state an objective, not to write a
statute." 74 This historical belief in co-existence of the clauses is
grounded in the overarching objective of religious liberty. 75 Under
the Free Exercise Clause, individuals have the right to choose
without state interference. 76 The Establishment Clause further
ensures liberty by preventing a heavy government hand in
77
religion.
Constitutional scholars suggest that three schools of thought
78
influenced the framers while drafting the First Amendment.
79
Some argued that religion needed protection from government;
80
others argued the reverse; while still others believed that neither
government nor religion was the aggressor, and if left alone they
would develop their respective spheres. 81 Professor Laurence
Tribe concludes that when conflicts arise, history and case law
indicate that one should err on the side of free exercise over antiestablishment.8 2 This approach favors diversity over fear.
72. See Brady, supra note 2, at 162-64 (describing the Lemon test, the
"coercion" test, and the "endorsement" test). The endorsement test, developed by
Justice O'Connor in Lynch, is particularly relevant to Native American religion and
sacred sites on public lands. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 32-33.
This test builds on the Lemon test's effect prong by "[flocusing on the evil of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691. Here,
even the intention to "convey a message of endorsement or disapproval" would be
violative. Id. But, as to Native American religious protection on public lands, this
test may provide the most assurances of not violating the Establishment Clause
because accommodating religion is not necessarily an endorsement. See Cross &
Brenneman, supra note 22, at 32-33; Brady, supra note 2, at 164.
73. See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1154 (noting that in the religion clauses, "the
framers represented relatively clear statements of highly compatible goals").
74. Id. at 1155 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
75. See id. at 1156-57.
76. See id. at 1157.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1158.
79. See id. (describing the Roger Williams school).
80. See id. at 1158-59 (describing the Jefferson school).
81. See id. at 1159 (describing the Madison school).
82. See id. at 1201.
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Unfortunately, such a context is seemingly overlooked as
modern courts struggle to balance the two clauses, believing that
"the single word 'religion' governs two prohibitions and governs
them alike."8 3 Thus, in order to avoid a situation of irresolvable
conflict, the First Amendment is understood to require a balancing
act where the absolute terms of both clauses struggle for neutral
ground.94 However, the judges that employ this balancing, and the
history they use to guide them, never conceived that the "unitary
pristine nature of the high country" was the equivalent of a church
85
for Native American religions.
A First Amendment dilemma arises when Native American
tribes ask federal land management agencies to implement
programs or undertake actions to allow tribal religious practices
and protect sacred sites located on public lands; or conversely,
when parties challenge agency actions as an endorsement of
religion. Neither Congress nor federal land management agencies
may manage federal lands in a manner that violates the
Constitution. 86 However, it is equally clear that agencies must
accommodate Native American religion, because the Constitution
"affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of
all religions."8 7 Consequently, federal land management agency
accommodation of Native American religious practices and
protection of sacred sites on public lands is a line-drawing
exercise. The agency must protect and accommodate Native
The
American free exercise without establishing a religion.
current strategy for drawing these lines involves a balancing
approach whereby federal land management agencies weigh
competing interests in a collaborative process to develop a
management plan that respects all user groups. The rub, of
course, is that no First Amendment line-drawing exercise can do
88
away with the blurred nuances of the religion clauses.
83. Id. at 1186 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, JJ., dissenting)).
84. See id. at 1157.
85. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 692
(9th Cir. 1985).
86. See Hooker, supra note 52, at 137.
87. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); Brady, supra note 2, at 162.
88. The NPS, at Devils Tower National Monument, implemented a
collaborative process incorporating the conflicting user groups. See infra notes 183186 and accompanying text. That collaborative process produced the Final
Climbing Management Plan. See infra note 183-184 and accompanying text. The
Bear Lodge district court ruled the plan constitutionally permissible largely
because it struck an appropriate balance between competing user groups. See Bear
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B. Native American Religious and Cultural Site Protection:
Statutes, Executive Orders, and Other Legal Methods
1. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978
Congress has the authority to establish a statutory structure
that promotes federal government efforts to accommodate Native
American religious practices. 89 Unfortunately, it employs this
authority only in limited circumstances. 90 For example, in 1978
Congress passed the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
(AIRFA).9 1 AIRFA established the policy to preserve Native
American tribes' "inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and
exercise the traditional religions ...including but not limited to
access to sites ... and the freedom to worship through ceremonials
and traditional rights." 92 The Supreme Court decided that AIRFA
is little more than a Congressional policy statement that provides
no substantive relief for Native American tribes. 93 Regrettably,

Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1456-57 (D. Wyo. 1998).
At Rainbow Bridge National Monument, the NPS has followed the Devils Tower
balancing model. See infra notes 274-286 and accompanying text. If the balancing
aspect of plan is brought into question by one of the parties involved, a court will
determine if the balance struck by the agency is constitutionally permissible.
89. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchock, 187 U.S. 553, 567-68 (1903) (holding that
Congress has broad legislative latitude to act in tribes' best interest). Congress'
power to legislate on Native American affairs stems from its plenary authority
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.; Worcester v.
Congress' power to legislate on
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
management of federal lands derives from its plenary power under the Property
Clause. See U.S. CONST.art. IV, § 3, cl.2; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539
(1976).
90. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 22.
91. Pub. L. No. 95-341, 92 Stat. 469 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994)).
92. Id.
93. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455
(1988). AIRFA does not even hint at "any intent to create a cause of action or any
judicially enforceable individual rights." Id. But, "the absence of any private right
of action in no way undermines the statute's significance as an express
congressional determination that federal land management decisions are not
'internal' Government 'procedures,' but are instead governmental actions that can
and indeed are likely to burden Native American religious practices." Id. at 471
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Dismissing the Act as ineffectual "seems to miss Justice
Brennan's point that even though there is no statutory cause of action created by
AIRFA, it is nonetheless mandatory that federal land managers view its commands
with the utmost seriousness." Brady, supra note 2, at 174. A stronger AIRFA
"could have required a detailed study such as that mandated by the National
Environmental Policy Act." Ward, supra note 68, at 816. Under that regime,
courts would review federal land management agency decisions to ensure that the
decisions were based on adequate information and fully considered all aspects of
the religious issues. See id.
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94
AIRFA is best known as a bill that "has no teeth."
Even though AIRFA may have no teeth, it is a clear
congressional directive to federal land management agencies to
give due consideration to agency actions that may affect Native
This due
American sacred sites and religious freedom. 95
consideration could take the form of agency policy, procedure,
These practices or
consultation, or even greater access. 96
substantial aid
to
little
would
amount
procedures, however,
that
falls well short
because AIRFA is effectively a policy directive
of being a statutory vehicle for protection of Native Americans
97
from laws favorable to the general public.

2.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993

In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act 98 (RFRA) in specific response to the Supreme Court's decision
In Smith, the Court
in Employment Division v. Smith. 99
determined that when "a valid and neutral law of general
applicability" merely incidentally prohibits the exercise of religion,
Under RFRA, the
the First Amendment is not offended. 100
94. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455 (citing 124 CONG. REC. 21,444, 21,445 (1978)
(comment of Rep. Udall, sponsor of bill)).
95. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
96. See id. (describing federal agency duties under AIRFA).
97. See id. at 746.
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
99. Employment Division,Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). Writing for the majority in Smith, Justice Scalia determined
that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the
law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)."
Id. at 879 (internal quotations omitted). Congress responded to the Smith decision
by enacting RFRA, which reinstated the requirement of governmental justification
for laws burdening the practice of religion even in cases where the law enacted is
religiously neutral. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (setting forth the specific finding that
Smith virtually eliminated the necessity of governmental justification of burdens
placed on religion by laws that are religiously neutral, and delineating the purpose
of restoring the compelling interest balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963)); see also Grimm, supra note 49, at 22-23 (describing Smith and
the congressional response); Hooker, supra note 52, at 154 (discussing Smith and
the congressional investigation and response, particularly the testimony of
Professor Philip Frickey, then of the University of Minnesota Law School, before
the Senate Indian Affairs Committee). President Clinton explained that RFRA
reversed "the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith and
reestablish[ed] a standard that better protects all Americans of all faiths in the
exercise of their religion." GETCHES ET AL., supra note 35, at 778 n.2 (citing
Religious Freedom Restoration Act Signing Ceremony, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Nov.
16, 1993).
100. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
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government can only "substantially burden" a person's exercise of
their religion when it has relied on the least restrictive means
possible to further a compelling interest. 101 In 1997, the Supreme
Court ruled RFRA unconstitutional. 10 2 Thus, the pre-Smith
balancing test that provided more protection for religious practices
by placing the burden on government to show a compelling
interest and use of the least restrictive means is no longer
103
applicable.
Congress' effort to ensure that government agencies,
including federal land management agencies, did not substantially
burden Native Americans' ability to practice their religions briefly
provided an avenue for tribes to challenge all neutral and
generally applicable regulatory laws that incidentally restricted
their exercise of religion. In ruling the Act unconstitutional, the
Court solidified Lyng as the controlling law for federal land
management and Native American religious practices on public
lands. 104 Consequently, Lyng's redefinition of a burden on religion
as something coercive or prohibitive in nature continues to
effectively undermine most Native American Free Exercise claims
because few agency actions rise to that level of coercion. 105
3.

Executive Order 13,007

In May 1996, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,007.106 It provides that federal agencies shall "(1) accommodate
access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian
religious practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the
physical integrity of such sacred sites." 10 7 The Order is novel in
that it expressly requires federal land management agencies to

101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a)(3).
102. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court ruled RFRA
unconstitutional because the Act was in scope and content broader than Congress'
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 527-36.
103. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 22.
104. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 23 ('The courthouse door closed by... Lyng
and re-opened by Congress when it passed RFRA appears now to have been closed
again.").
105. Hooker, supra note 52, at 155 ("Lyng thus arguably redefined a 'burden' on
the free exercise of religion to include only coercion or penalties surrounding the
practice of religion, and to exclude the destruction of religious beliefs."); see also
Miller, supra note 57, at 1062 (arguing that "[i]f the Court did not see a violation of
the Indian religious practices in ... [Lyng] in the foreseeable future, this Court will
not find for Indian people on a free exercise issue").
106. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 1996).
107. Id. § l(a).
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"avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sacred
sites." 10 8 This mandate is directly applicable to conflicts between
recreational activities and the physical integrity of sacred sites on
public lands.
For example, in the Bear Lodge litigation, the NPS's climbing
management plan-both the draft and final versions-incorporated
a ban on rock climbers' abilities to drill climbing anchors into
Devils Tower. 10 9 This physical integrity component of the Order is
a logical and reasonable federal land management directive
because without protection and preservation of the physical sites,
the requirement to consider and accommodate tribal religious
practices is meaningless. 110 Executive Order 13,007's attempt to
protect sacred sites is important because the loss of sacred sites is
potentially devastating to Native American religions and
cultures."' Broadly, this Executive Order simply restates the
AIRFA principles already applicable to federal land management
agencies. 112 The Order, however, incorporates qualifying language
that limits federal land management agency implementation of
the objectives to situations where it is "not clearly inconsistent
with essential agency functions" and only "to the extent
practicable."'1 3 Executive Order 13,007, therefore, is largely a
hortatory and aspirational expression of government policy.114
4.

Other Methods of Legal Protection

Commentators and legal scholars suggest other possibilities
for providing protection to Native American religious practices at
sacred sites on public lands." 5 Those possibilities include Section
108. Id.; see also Grimm, supra note 49, at 78 (commenting that "section 1(a)(2)
[of the Executive Order] adds something new by focusing agencies on the physical
integrity of sites").
109. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819-20 (10th
Cir. 1999).
110. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 78.
111. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 462
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 78. Compare the Executive Order's objective
"to accommodate" Native American religious practices at sacred sites to AIRFA's
directive "to consider" Native American religious practices at sacred sites. See id.
113. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, § 1(a) (May 24, 1996).
114. The Executive Order is substantively similar to AIRFA, and AIRFA is
purely an aspirational statute. See Ward, supra note 68, at 816. "Exceedingly
cautious language," such as 'to the extent practicable, permitted by law, and not
clearly inconsistent with agency functions,"' serves to diminish the Order's agencybinding power. Grimm, supra note 49, at 24, 78 (internal citation omitted).
115. See Ward, supra note 68, at 815-23.
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106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, 116 the National
Forest Management Act, 117 and the Antiquities Act of 1906.118
Environmental statutes such as the National Environmental
Policy Act" 19 could also provide protection. Finally, Indian law
scholars advocate an extension of the federal government's trust
responsibility to Native Americans so that the "fiduciary duty" of
the government extends to the protection of sacred sites and
Native American religious freedom on public lands. 120 Under this
trust responsibility, the government's actions as a protector are
12
held to the highest moral standard. '
116. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2000). The National Historic Preservation Act requires
agencies to "take into account the effect of [their actions] on" eligible or already
listed properties where so-called "traditional" cultural property values play a
significant role in listing. Id.
117. 16 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). The National Forest Management Act requires
agencies to seek tribal input during the land management decision planning
process. See Brady, supra note 2, at 173.
118. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (2000). Pursuant to the Antiquities Act, tribes could
advocate for the designation of sacred sites as national monuments. See Ward,
supra note 68, at 818.
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1994). The National Environmental Policy Act
requires that agencies consider all possible environmental ramifications before
undertaking major actions. See Exec. Order No. 11,574, 35 Fed. Reg. 19,627 (Dec.
23, 1970), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994). Tribes can use that process to
"draw attention to the desecration of sacred lands and ... mobilize political
opposition." Ward, supra note 68, at 821.
120. See Ward, supra note 68, at 821-22. Chief Justice Marshall created the
trust concept when he stated that the relationship between the United States and
tribes "resembles that of a ward to his guardian." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30
U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831). This trust concept is prevalent in Indian law affairs
including tribal treaty rights and claims to land and water. See Ward, supra note
68, at 821-22. All branches of the government have this fiduciary obligation. See
Matthew Perkins, The Federal Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden
Eagle ProtectionAct.- Could Application of the Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v.
Hugs?, 30 ENVrL. L. 701, 714 (2000).
121. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 44 n.195; Seminole Nation v.
United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 n.12 (1941). Describing government's fiduciary
duty to Native Americans, the Seninole Nation Court quoted then-Chief Judge
Cardozo, who remarked:
A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
Only thus has the level of conduct for
the standard of behavior ....
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd.
Id. (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)). Commentators
suggest this fiduciary trust duty is "extra-constitutional" and therefore not subject
to First Amendment balancing exercises. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22,
at 44. At the district court during the Bear Lodge litigation, Justice Department
attorneys "emphasized the federal government's trust responsibility to the tribes."
Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 228-29. Specifically, the government argued
that it "enjoys very substantial latitude in fulfilling that responsibility in the
accommodation of Native American religion." Id. The district court cursorily
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In addition, Congress has the legislative power to create sitespecific acts to protect Native American interests in public
lands. 122 Congress could also establish a general statute regarding
sacred site and public lands protection and/or management that
incorporates the crucial Native American concept that the "land is
itself a sacred, living being,' 123 However, even if Congress took
site-specific or broader legislative action, the dichotomy of the
First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses
remains an issue as public lands resource user groups advocate for
their exclusive use of the land. 124 Therefore, the legislative
branch, like the judiciary, must ultimately satisfy the careful
balancing requirement between protecting free exercise and
preventing an establishment of religion.
III. Devils Tower: The Beginning of Life and the Center of
Controversy
Devils Tower National Monument, or Bear Lodge, is located
in northeastern Wyoming. Geological evidence shows that the
25
Tower is hardened magma from the neck of an extinct volcano.'
Earth stresses sixty million years ago uplifted the continental
crust, thereby allowing magma to form in the shape of the
Tower. 126 The Tower stands 1267 feet high1 27 and presides over
the area as the dominant landscape feature. 128 The Tower is not a
dismissed this argument. See id.
122. Examples of congressional acts based on sacred site-specific reasons
include: provision of 48,000 acres in the Carson National Forest for Taos Indians;
placement of 185,000 acres in the Grand Canyon National Park in trust for the
Havasupai Indians; designation of portions of the Six Rivers National Forest as
wilderness in response to the Lyng controversy; and creation of El Malpais
National Monument to protect sacred lava flows. See Hooker, supra note 52, at
139-40 (providing a detailed description of the "four instances [in which] Congress
addressed American Indian free exercise claims on a site-specific basis").
123. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
124. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why
"Multiple Use" Failed, 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 405, 407-08 (1994). Professor
Blumm described the process where "Public Choice theory predicts that small, wellorganized special interest groups will exert a disproportionate influence on
policymaking." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
125. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 201-02.
126. See id. at 201.
127. GREAT OUTDOOR RECREATION PAGES, DEvILs TOWER NATIONAL
(last
MONUMENT,
at http://www.gorp.com/gorp/resource/us_NMwy-devil.htm
visited Mar. 14, 2002). Not including the base, the Tower is 867 feet tall, which is
310 feet taller than the Washington Monument.
128. See FROMMER'S, OVERVIEW OF DEVILS TOWER NATIONAL MONUMENT, at
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smooth rock formation; rather, it is a series of uneven columns
that are constantly evolving. 129 This texture provides a different
and awe-inspiring view of the Tower from every angle. 130 The
Monument is so striking that it served as a centerpiece for director
131
Steven Spielberg's movie Close Encounters of the Third Kind.
A. The Native American Religious Perspective
For many Native American tribes, Bear Lodge is the physical
representation of their culture's creation story. 132 The Native
American name for the Tower in Lakota is Mateo Teepee, or Mato
Tipi, which roughly translated means Bear's Lodge or Bear's
Teepee. 133 The name derives from tribal creation stories where
seven young girls fled bears by jumping onto a small rock
outcrop. 13 4 As the bears closed in, the girls prayed for the rock's
aid, and the rock grew to the stars where the young girls became
the seven stars of the Big Dipper. 35 The distinctive columnar
characteristics of the Tower are attributed to the furious
36
scratching of the pursuing bears. 1
Some tribes, like the Lakota Sioux, have performed their

http://www.frommers.com/destinations/devilstowernationalmonumentl (last visited
Mar. 14, 2002).
129. For pictures of the Tower and other sites at the Monument, see NORTHEAST
ALBUM,
at
DEVILS
TOWER,
WYOMING
PHOTO
WYOMING,
http://www.newyoming.com/DevilsTower/PhotoAlbum/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2002).
130. See id.
131. See George Linge, Ensuring the Full Freedom of Religion on Public Lands:
Devils Tower and the Protection of Indian Sacred Sites, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 307, 307 n.1 (2000).
132. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 201-02 (comparing Western and
Native American versions of the Tower's place in creation); id. at 202 n.4 (detailing
different tribes' creation stories for Bear Lodge). Ethno-histories of the Devils
Tower area indicate that "at least six tribes have varying degrees of cultural
affiliation with the Tower." Id. at 206. For Native Americans, culture and religion
are essentially simply mirrors of each other. See Ward, supra note 68, at 799
(remarking that '"religion' is an English word without equivalent in many Indian
languages, where 'religion' is not distinct from 'culture"). The district court in Bear
Lodge even concluded that it was not "persuaded that a legitimate distinction can
be drawn in this case between the 'religious' and 'cultural' practices of those
American Indians who consider Devils Tower a sacred site." Bear Lodge Multiple
Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 n.2. (D.Wyo. 1998). Each tribe that
joined the Medicine Wheel Coalition presumably became involved to protect their
specific tribal interest in Bear Lodge.
133. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 201 n.1.
134. See id. at 201.
135. See id.; see also Brady, supra note 2, at 165 (recounting in brief the tribal
myth of the creation of Devils Tower).
136. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 201.
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most important ceremonies at Bear Lodge for over 10,000 years. 137
Archaeological evidence places other tribes in the Devils Tower
area as early 1500 A.D. 138 Today, the Lakota still perform yearly
Sun Dances in June to celebrate the summer solstice; 139 ritual
prayer offerings continue to occur at the Tower; 140 and Bear Lodge
4
remains a crucial component of oral tribal histories.1 1
Perhaps the most private and personal present-day religious
practice is the placing of prayer offerings at the Tower's base. 42 A
prayer bundle is typically a colorfully bound collection of sage or
tobacco. 143 The bundle is usually used as part of a private
ceremony between an individual tribal member and a spirit. 144
Without Bear Lodge, the tribes' ability to pass their religious
and cultural practices to the next generation is severely limited. 145
Practical benefit also derives from such religious practices because
revitalization of traditional religious and cultural practices often
counters tribal social problems. 146 In the Bear Lodge litigation,
tribal representatives remarked that they appeared in federal
court "to protect our traditions because we believe that our
traditions are in fact the root of the solution to all of our societal
ills." 47 The protection and preservation of Native American
137. See Brady, supra note 2, at 165 (citing interview with Greg Bourland,
president of the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe, stating that "for about 10,000 to
12,000 years, [the Lakotas] performed an annual Sun Dance at Devils Tower").
Religious ceremonies such as the Sun Dance have taken place at Devils Tower for
thousands of years, and the Lakota have historically been victims of incredible
injustice in part due to their religious practices. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816-17 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing one instance of
such injustice, though unrelated to the Sun Dance ceremony: "In 1890... the
United States Calvary shot and killed 300 unarmed Sioux men, women, and
children en route to [a] ... Ghost Dance; these included individuals from the
Intervenors' tribes").
138. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 206 (noting establishment of
Eastern Shoshone tribe's existence).
139. See id. at 208; Brady, supra note 2, at 165.
140. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 208.
141. See id. at 207-08.
142. See id. at 208.
143. See id. at 210.
144. See Jurgita Saltanaviciute, Native American Sacred Sites: Battle for
Protection
(2000) •(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wyoming),
http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/Rgodby/ENR2000/Saltanaviciutethesis.htm
(last
visited Mar. 14, 2002).
145. Brady, supra note 2, at 166 ('In light of the growing number of
contemporary Native Americans turning away from their traditional cultures, such
teachings are imperative to the survival of those proud traditions.").
146. See id. at 167.
147. Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 229.
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religious freedom and sacred sites on public lands, therefore, may
correctly be characterized as a matter of survival.
Disturbing Native American sacred sites causes the spirits
occupying those sites to flee. 148 This connection between sacred
sites, religious practices, and spiritual beliefs represents the
fundamental doctrinal difference between Native American and
traditional Western religions. 149 That the "land is itself a sacred,
150
living being" is the essence of Native American religions.
Beyond doctrinal differences, Western and Native American
cultures also differ with regard to ideas of property ownership. 15'
For example, a familiar Western legal tool is the description of
property rights as a "bundle of sticks."'1 52 The bundle represents
53
that property rights are all-encompassing as to fee title to land.
In contrast, Native Americans never conceived of fee title
ownership outright, but instead developed structures of property
54
around limited use of communal lands.1
Federal land management policies, structures, and decisions
presently allow activities on public lands that imperil sacred sites.
These include mining, large-scale federal water projects, forestry
These
operations, and a continual influx of recreation. 155
activities, according to Native American tribes, drive away and kill
148. See Ward, supra note 68, at 797.
149. See id. at 798-99 ("Native American religions are difficult to understand
within the doctrinal confines of the major religions of the Western World."); see also
Brady, supra note 2, at 157-59 (comparing and contrasting Native American and
Christian faiths).
150. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 473 (explaining that "the dominant Western culture, which views
land in terms of ownership and use" conflicts with "that of Native Americans, in
which concepts of private property are not only alien, but contrary to a belief
system that holds land sacred"). Certain Native Americans developed ownership
concepts for discrete sites like fishing spots. See Michael C. Blumm & Brett M.
Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific
Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 422 (1998).
However, the tribes did not generally subscribe to the objective of taming the
wilderness and owning the land. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 12
(commenting on "America's seeming obsession with the destruction of those
irreplaceable cultural and social resources embodied in what most Americans
regarded as an impenetrable and foreboding Indian-dominated wilderness").
152. See ichael R. Newhouse, Recognizing and Preserving Native American
Treaty Usufructs in the Supreme Court.: The Mille Lacs Case, 21 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 169, 170 (2000).
153. See id. at 170 n.8.
154. See id. at 170.
155. See Ward, supra note 68, at 805-07 (discussing federal land management
authorized activities that destroy sacred lands).
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the Native American spirits that are woven into the land. 156 For
example, the construction of Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado
River created Lake Powell, which the Navajo Nation believes
157
drowned Navajo Gods.
At Devils Tower, tribal members also express concern that
Tower climbing prevents them from teaching their children
respect for their religion because the children "see people 'playing'
on such an important shrine."'5
Tribal members complain that
the presence of climbers in general disrupts the peacefulness
necessary for religious practices. 159 In addition, placing climbing
bolts and anchors into the rock adversely affects the physical
integrity of the Tower and "seriously impair[s] the spiritual
quality of the site."' 60 Perhaps most intrusively, researchers have
even documented cases of climbers removing sacred prayer
bundles.161
To be fair, not all climbers disrespect Native American
practices at the Monument. 162 Moreover, not all Native Americans
163
consider Bear Lodge in a sacred or religious context.
Nevertheless, the concerns that are expressed by Native

156. See Ward, supra note 68, at 802-03, 803 n.44 (noting that the spirits are
inseparable from the land, and that destroying the land drives away or kills the
spirits). For example, in Badoni v. Higginson, the Tenth Circuit recognized that
from the Navajo perspective, impounding water in Lake Powell would inundate
Rainbow Bridge and drown Navajo Gods. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172,
177 (10th Cir. 1980). In Badoni, the Navajo plaintiffs argued, in the court's words,
that "if humans alter the earth in the area of the Bridge ... [their] prayers will not
be heard by the gods and their ceremonies will be ineffective to prevent evil and
disease." Id. at 177.
157. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 177.
158. Brady, supra note 2, at 166.
159. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir.
1999) (noting that climbers can intrude on "solitude").
160. Id. at 818 (citing FCMP at iii).
161. See id. at 818; see also Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that
researchers' student witnessed taking of prayer offering).
162. Brady, supra note 2, at 185 n.138 ("[T]he vast majority of climbers at Devils
Tower are respecting the voluntary ban on June climbing, and staying away from
the site during that month."); see also Chris Smith & Elizabeth Manning, The
Sacred and the Profane Collide in the West, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, May 26, 1997
(stating that after the voluntary ban was initiated, "85 percent of the climbers
complied"),
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.URLRemapper/1997/may26/dir/Feature-thesacre
d.htm.
163. See Smith & Manning, supra note 162. For example, "[tihere are also
plenty of Indians who-whether it's because they practice Christianity, live in a city,
or even work for a federal agency-ignore the fights over sacred lands." Id. Often,
for those Native Americans, a national monument is "just a tourist attraction." Id.
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Americans at Bear Lodge and other sacred sites are compelling
reasons to create a federal land management structure capable of
protecting these sites and Native American religious practices
conducted on them. As the tribes remarked during the Bear Lodge
litigation, and as a majority of commentators have noted, U.S.
society would not allow similar activities to occur at Western
164
religious sites.
B. The Climbers'RecreationalPerspective
America's climbing history is a rich one, full of epic
Many
conquests, noble intentions, and colorful personas. 165
1 66
climbers retreat to the outdoors to escape urban environments.
Climbing represents an opportunity to experience adventure,
natural beauty, and solitude. 167 When considered in this context,
68
climbers often describe their passion to climb as "religion."'1

164. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170. An attorney for the Indian Law Resources
Center, Steve Gunn, argued in response to the Bear Lodge litigation that "[tihis
situation is no different than what other government agencies do on other federal
property. For example, recreational activities are not allow[ed] at Arlington
National Cemetery during religious ceremonies." Id. Gunn also remarked that
"there are countless churches and chapels on government lands that, when services
are taking place, disruptive activities are simply not allowed." Id. Commentators
have noted that no time soon will the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem be tern down to
"build a shopping mall." Miller, supra note 57, at 1037. Miller further noted,
"Usually, the only Indian religious values that are upheld are ones that judges can
analogize to Judeo-Christian precepts." Id. at 1041. Building a road through a
Native American sacred site is easily analogized to building a road through a
church; climbing at Devils Tower is easily analogized to climbing the dome of St.
Peter's Cathedral in Rome. Just as climbing would intrude upon worship in a
cathedral, temple, or mosque, climbing intrudes on Native American worship at
Devils Tower. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 214. Yet courts fail to
recognize this similarity. Interestingly, if collaborative balancing efforts at Devils
Tower and Rainbow Bridge National Monuments are constitutionally invalid,
similar agency accommodation at other parks for Christian religion should be
constitutionally invalid as well. See Smith & Manning, supra note 162.
165. See Timothy Dolan, Fixed Anchors and the Wilderness Act: Is the Adventure
Over?, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 355, 355 n.2 (providing a brief list of early influential
climbs). One of the Nation's great environmentalists, John Muir, proffered the
suggestion to "[c]limb the mountains and get their good tidings." Id. at 367.
166. See id. at 366 (noting that climbers seek a "primitive and unconfined type of
recreation").
167. See id.
168. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 215 (describing the process of
climbers and tribal representatives learning about each other). During work group
meetings for the FCMP process, climbers "explained that for some the act of
climbing was a kind of religious experience, and therefore climbing should be
afforded any accommodations provided to American Indian religious practitioners."
Id.; see also Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 22 n.69 (commenting that the
FCMP recognized that some climbers expressed feelings that they "enjoy a sense of
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Climbing at Devils Tower National Monument has a roughly
one-hundred-year history. 169
Today, climbers are "part of
monument culture,"'170 and the NPS recognizes climbing as an
historical activity at the Monument. 171 The climbing at Devils
Tower is world-class because of the large selection of high quality
crack climbing routes located on it. 172 Consequently, the climbing
community considers it worthwhile to travel even great distances
to the Tower. For example, almost seventy-five percent of climbers
interviewed during NPS surveys indicated that they had traveled
more than six hours to climb at the Tower. 173 The Tower is
steadily gaining an international reputation for its premier
74
climbing. 1
Certainly not all climbers agree with the select group of
recreational climbers and commercial climbing guides who chose
to file suit challenging the FCMP's mandatory and voluntary
closure iterations. 175 Yet even well-intentioned climbers capable of
psychological and spiritual satisfaction in reaching the summit of Devils Tower').
169. Evidence suggests that the first climbing on the Tower occurred in 1893.
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir. 1999);
see also Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 54 (noting that the first public climb was
made on July 4, 1893). Hanson and Moore further relate that "[b]etween 1938 and
1950 approximately ten parties of climbers ascended Devils Tower." Id. at 54. In
slightly over twenty years, that number had increased to "more than 500 parties
climbing annually." Id.
170. Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 54.
171. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 818.
172. See id. (citing FCMP); see also Brady, supra note 2, at 166 (noting that the
climbing community considers the Tower "a big draw for those interested in the
best 'crack climbing' in the world"). Crack climbers are "free" climbers in that they
ascend a route by climbing in naturally formed cracks in the rock, placing and then
removing impermanent protection devices. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at
59. In contrast, sport climbers typically climb the face of the rock by relying on
bolted, permanently fixed anchors. See id. It is estimated that "[tioday the tower
has about 220 named routes," and that "[alpproximately 600 metal bolts are
currently embedded in the rock along with several hundred metal pitons." Bear
Lodge, 175 F.3d at 818 (citing FCMP).
173. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 58.
174. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 211.
175. The Access Fund served as the climbing representative for formulation of
the FCMP. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 212 n.63. The Access Fund, the
climbing community's principle advocacy organization, "voted to oppose the
lawsuit." Open Letter, Why the Access Fund Did Not Support the Devils Tower
Lawsuit, 15 ACCESS NOTES (The Access Fund, Boulder, Colo.), Fall 1996, at 2 (on
file with author). Specifically, the Fund chose not to participate in the litigation
because it "had negotiated in good faith with the other participants on the Planning
Team, and believed that asking climbers to voluntarily refrain from climbing on the
Tower during traditional Indian ceremonial periods was consistent with the Access
Fund's policy of developing cooperative, non-regulatory solutions to competing uses
of public lands." Id. Moreover, the Fund noted that the commercial outfitters had
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recognizing the cultural and religious significance of traditional
Native American ceremonies often climb at Devils Tower National
Monument. 176 Some climbers believe they have a "right to climb"
177
because it is their public land.
C. The National Park Service Land Management
Perspective
Congress has plenary power under the Property Clause to
manage federal lands. 178 It delegates that power to federal land
management agencies, including the NPS. 79 At Devils Tower
National Monument, the NPS's management objective is to protect
the values President Roosevelt established in 1906, when he
designated the Tower and 1300 surrounding acres as the country's
first national monument. 8 0 The NPS has determined that a
primary value of the Tower is its Native American cultural
significance.181 The NPS also determined that it would manage
82
the Tower as a rock climbing site.
In 1995, Deborah Liggett, then-Superintendent of Devils
Tower National Monument, employed her wide discretion as a
federal land manager and responded to the intensifying conflict
between Native Americans and climbers by issuing the FCMP.183
The NPS did not craft and issue the first FCMP hastily. In stark
contrast, the NPS, led by Liggett, initiated and completed a
collaborative process that involved the antagonistic user groups.184
This collaborative process was intended to avoid just the type of

their own advocacy organization, while the Fund spoke for recreational and private
climbers. See id.
176. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 58-59 (noting that interviews showed
that ninety-five percent planned to return to climb again and that sixty-seven
percent said knowledge of Native American issues would not stop them from
climbing).
177. See id. at 59; FRIENDS OF DEvILS TOWER, THE ISSUE, at http://www.devilstower.com/freedom (last visited Mar. 14, 2002).
178. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
179. See George C. Coggins, Regulating Federal Natural Resources: A Summary
Against Devolved Collaboration,25 EcOLOGY L.Q. 602, 602 (1999).
180. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 819 n.7 (10th
Cir. 1999) ("President Roosevelt declared the Tower is 'a natural wonder and an
object of historic and great scientific interest... [and] warning is hereby given to
all unauthorized persons not to appropriate, injure, or destroy any feature of the
natural tower." (quoting Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236, 3237 (1906))).
181. See id. at 819.
182. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 21.
183. See id. at 8-9, 23-24.
184. See id. at 24.
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conflict that later resulted in the revised, second FCMP.
Consensus-building both defined the NPS's perspective and was
its objective for FCMP process. 8 5
According to the NPS,
consensus-building would lead to broad-based acceptance of future
86
management plans for the Monument.
The stated purpose of the FCMP is "to protect the natural
and cultural resources of Devils Tower and to provide for visitor
enjoyment and appreciation of this unique feature.' 1 87 In addition,
the FCMP "sets a new direction for managing climbing activity at
the Tower for the next three to five years."'' 8 Because the NPS is
relying on climber self-regulation to satisfy the revised plan's
requirements, it is crucial for the NPS that the consensus-building
atmosphere developed during formulation of the FCMP translates
into effective implementation. 8 9 This self-regulation is the crux of
the FCMP's voluntary ban on climbing on the Tower during June,
when ceremonies honoring the summer solstice mark the peak
month of Native American religious practices. 190
In addition to the voluntary June closure, the FCMP
prohibits new bolts, fixed pitons, or new routes requiring either.191
The FCMP also highlights the need for access trail maintenance
and requires camouflaged climbing equipment. 192
The NPS
announced that if the voluntary plan is not successful, it would
revise the climbing plan, restart the collaborative planning
93
process, and implement mandatory closure during June. 1
The NPS set a high standard of success for the voluntary
closure, stating that full success is achieved "when every climber
personally chooses not to climb at Devils Tower during June out of
respect for American Indian cultural values."' 194 The climbing
community accepted the FCMP through its representative, the
185. See id.; Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5,at 212-17.
186. See Burton & Ruppert,supra note 5,at 211-14.
187. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819 (quoting FCMP at i).
188. Id.
189. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D.
Wyo. 1998).
190. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820; see also Brady, supra note 2, at 165
(discussing the importance of June as the month the Lakota and other tribes gather
to perform the Sun Dance, one of the most important expressions of the tribes'
faith).
191. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 819.
192. See id.
193. See Brady, supra note 2, at 168; see also Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 820 (citing
FCMP at 23).
194. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1449-50.
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Access Fund.195 The Access Fund reasoned that benefits deriving
from cooperative efforts, voluntary self-regulation, and the
favorable public and agency opinion that climbers would gain by
refraining from climbing in June as a "gesture of respect" far
outweighed the other option: mandatory June climbing closure,
combative relations with the NPS and tribes, and typecasting as
an interest group pariah. 196 A small group of mostly commercial
climbing outfitters, however, chose to challenge both the draft
climbing plan, which advocated a mandatory June closure, and the
97
altered FCMP's voluntary June closure.1
IV. The Striking Similarities Between the Bear Lodge
Litigation and the Rainbow Bridge Controversy
A.

The District Court Opinion in Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n v. Babbitt

In June 1996, the federal district court of Wyoming first
addressed the NPS's attempts to accommodate Native American
98
religious practices at Devils Tower National Monument.
Specifically, the court ruled on a preliminary injunction motion
filed by plaintiffs-a coalition formed to advocate for development
of natural resources to maintain economic stability. 199 The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that the NPS's first version of the FCMP
violated the Establishment Clause because it contained a
mandatory closure provision and denied commercial climbing
200
permits for the month of June.
Commentary by legal scholars and other observers on the
court's analysis has been primarily negative. These criticisms
focus on the court's preliminary injunction ruling, opining that the
court confused Free Exercise and Establishment Clause case
law. 20' Critics argue that the court first detailed the prevailing
Establishment Clause test but then applied the Lyng Free

195. See supra note 175.
196. See supra note 175.
197. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1449-50.
198. See generally Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448.
199. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170-71.
200. See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450; Brady, supra note 2, at 170.
201. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 27 (arguing that by relying on
the Supreme Court's Lyng decision and the Tenth Circuit's Badoni decision, the
court "effectively abolished any governmental opportunity to accommodate Native
American or other minority religious beliefs or practices").
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forced

a

strict

interpretation of Lyng onto the FCMP instead of applying the
Establishment Clause's traditional test, apparently believing the
203
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses to be interchangeable.
According to these critics, the original FCMP-which included the
mandatory ban-did not violate the Establishment Clause and
thus passed constitutional scrutiny. 20 4 The Wyoming federal
district court determined, however, that the plan's purpose in
denying commercial climbing permits amounted to government
coercion in favor of Native American religion. 20 5 Therefore, the
FCMP was an "impermissible government entanglement with
20 7
religion. 206 As such, the court ruled the plan unconstitutional.
The NPS reacted quickly to the court's preliminary injunction
ruling and eliminated the ban on commercial permits. 208 The NPS
recast the commercial climbing ban as a voluntary closure. 20 9 On
April 2, 1998, the district court concluded that because the
voluntary ban on both commercial and recreational climbing
balanced competing user group needs without violating the
Establishment Clause, "the plan constitute[d] a legitimate exercise
of the Secretary of the Interior's discretion in managing the
Monument." 210 The defendant NPS argued that because it had not

implemented the mandatory commercial climbing ban, plaintiffs'
claims were moot. 211 In response, plaintiffs argued that the mere

threat that the NPS

could re-institute the ban kept the

202. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 22 (noting that the court "appeared to be
relying primarily on Lyng and Badoni, but the language of its opinion cites the

third prong of the Lemon test").
203. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170 (describing Professor Raymond Cross'
analysis that argued "how the case would have come out under the Establishment
Clause, had Judge Downes properly utilized it"); see also Miller, supra note 57, at
1044-47 (describing the traditional Supreme Court test).
204. See Miller, supra note 57, at 1044-47; Brady, supra note 2, at 170-71. As
applied to the first FCMP, the Lemon test and the coercion and endorsement tests
for Establishment Clause questions indicate that either the government's interest
in protecting Native American religious freedom outweighed the burden on
climbers' ability to climb the Tower during June, or alternatively, the government
implemented the least restrictive means to further its compelling trust obligation
to Native Americans. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 29-39.
205. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170.
206. Grimm, supra note 49, at 22.
207. See Brady, supra note 2, at 170.
208. See BearLodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450.
209. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 22.
210. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456-57.
211. See id. at 1451-52.
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2
controversy live. 212 The court agreed with the NPS. 13
According to the court, plaintiffs could not transmute the
The court
agency's voluntary ban into a coerced ban. 214
ban
mandatory
to
the
determined that plaintiffs' challenges
215
controversy.
a
live
constituted
provision of the plan no longer
The court also concluded that plaintiffs had no standing to
challenge interpretative programs or signs placed in the
Monument grounds by the NPS to raise awareness of religious
practices within Monument grounds because they could not prove
these NPS efforts caused injury in fact. 216 The court did not rule
that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the voluntary climbing
the court ruled that the plan was
ban portions of the plan; instead,
21 7
permissible.
constitutionally

B.

The Tenth Circuit Opinion in Bear Lodge

Immediately after the district court's final decision upholding
the NPS's climbing management plan, the Mountain States Legal
Foundation (MSLF), which represented the plaintiffs, expressed
its intent to appeal to the Tenth Circuit. 218 The MSLF stated that
219
meant
the Tenth Circuit's 1980 decision in Badoni v. Higginson
220
dunk."
slam
a
"[flrankly...
was
appeal
that their
In Badoni, the Navajo Nation challenged the inundation of
Rainbow Bridge and subsequent increased tourist activity at the
Rainbow Bridge National Monument. 221 The Navajo alleged that
these actions violated their right to free exercise of religion. 222 The
Tenth Circuit determined that the Navajo did not raise a
legitimate claim because the government did not prohibit any
religious practices, 223 and "drew a line demarcating impermissible
accommodation in the area of public lands." 224 This Badoni-line

212. See id. at 1452.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1455.
215. See id. at 1452.
216. See id. at 1453.
217. See id. at 1456-57.
218. See Brady, supra note 2, at 172.
219. 638 F.2d 172, 176 (10th Cir. 1980).
220. Brady, supra note 2, at 172.
221. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 176.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 178.
224. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1455 (D.
Wyo. 1998).
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provides that the "[e]xercise of First Amendment freedoms may
not be asserted to deprive the public of its normal use of an
area."225 Emboldened by the Tenth Circuit decision in Badoni,
226
MSLF appealed the district court decision in Bear Lodge.
On April 26, 1999, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff
climbers lacked standing. 227
According to the Tenth Circuit,
plaintiffs alleged no injury deriving from their allegation that the
FCMP violated the Establishment Clause. 228 Consequently, even
though the FCMP voluntary ban clearly incensed the plaintiff
climbers, who believed in their right to recreational freedom, 229 the
court concluded that the climbers' lack of standing was
dispositive. 230 The court reasoned that because the FCMP ban was
merely voluntary, the climbers could always choose to climb
during the month of June. 23 1 Thus, the court concluded that the
232
FCMP caused no injury to plaintiffs.
The Tenth Circuit did not reach the merits of either the
plaintiffs' constitutional Establishment Clause challenge to the
FCMP or the government's defense that the FCMP amounted to
an appropriate accommodation to further the application of the
234
Free Exercise Clause. 233 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Therefore, the Bear Lodge district court decision is the final
judicial ruling on what types of federal land management
accommodations of Native American religious practices at Devils
Tower National Monument are constitutionally permissible.
C. Interpretingthe Bear Lodge Decisions
The district court's ruling at the preliminary injunction stage
in Bear Lodge amounted to an unfavorable view of federal land
management accommodation of Native American religious
practices on public lands because the court found the NPS's
reasonable efforts at accommodation unconstitutional. 235 At that
225.
226.
227.
1999).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Badoni, 638 F.2d at 179.
See supra text accompanying notes 218-220.
See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 822 (10th Cir.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 820-821.
See id. at 822.
See id.
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000).
See supra notes 205-207 and accompanying text.
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stage, the court directly tied its analysis to restrictive language in
Lyng and Badoni, which fails to adequately acknowledge that the
land is sacred to Native Americans. 236 Further, the district court
incorrectly applied one body of constitutional law to another
separate and distinct constitutional question.2 37 The plan survived
it to include a
constitutional scrutiny only after the NPS altered
238
voluntary, rather than mandatory, climbing ban.
and subsequent finding of
This agency alteration
constitutionality underscores the highly unstable posture of
In this instance,
reasonable agency management actions.
constitutionality clearly hinged on whether the climbing "ban"was
styled as voluntary or mandatory. 239 Further, the voluntary or
240
mandatory tightrope greatly influences the standing issue.
Based on the district court and court of appeals Bear Lodge
decisions, when a defendant agency can successfully show the
voluntary nature of a ban, plaintiffs alleging a violation of the
241
Establishment Clause will face significant standing hurdles.
This dynamic obviously sets the stage for litigating a ban
voluntary in name and form but mandatory in substance and
effect. Artful pleading, more favorable facts, or any combination of
the two may allow future plaintiffs to move past procedural
barriers to the constitutional merits. Finally, it may be the case at
either Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, or at some future sacred site
on public lands that a voluntary ban proves insufficient for
protection purposes because parties elect to disregard any such
ban. Assuming the agency remains receptive to Native American
concerns in such a case, the question again becomes how far can
an agency go to protect sacred sites and religious freedom without
establishing a religion.
Despite its final ruling, the district court persistently failed
to recognize the importance of the land to Native American
242
religious practices and the government's trust duty to the tribes.
243
This failure mimics the Supreme Court's oversights in Lyng.
236. See supra notes 6, 56, 203 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes and 201-204 and accompanying text.
238. See Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456-57.
239. See id. at 1456 C'[T]he remote and speculative possibility of a mandatory
ban.., is insufficient to transform the Government's action into a coercive
measure.").
240. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 822.
241. See id.
242. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 229.
243. See supraPart .
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The district court, in fact, questioned whether the tribes' effort and
time might not be better spent remedying Native American social
ills like alcoholism. 244 The tribes' response that protection of
religious practices would preserve and strengthen Native
American culture-thereby helping to remedy the very ills the
245
court highlighted-apparently fell on deaf ears.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit believing success was
assured by the Badoni decision. 246 However, the appellate court
did not reach the merits of the issues involved. 247 Thus, the
freedom of Native Americans to practice religious activities on
public lands remains tenuous in the Tenth Circuit because the
court has yet to apply Badoni to modern land management agency
accommodation efforts. Assuming future plaintiffs can establish
standing, it is likely that additional litigation will further restrict
Native American religious practices on public lands because
Badoni and Lyng tilt the balancing test against Native
Americans. 248 This weighting of factors against Native American
religious practices conversely lowers the standard that plaintiffs
challenging such uses must meet to prove a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 249 Consequently, tribes are left without
Free Exercise Clause protection when defending against
25 0
Establishment Clause challenges.

244. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 229. The judge wondered aloud
from the bench why the government had misapplied "such skilled legal talent to the
defense of the government's actions to accommodate tribal cultural preservation."

Id.
245. See id. The tribes began their closing remarks by stressing that they
"appear here in federal court to protect our traditions because we believe that our
traditions are in fact the root of the solution to all of our societal ills." Id.
246. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
247. See Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 814.
248. See notes 38, 93-94, 103-105 and accompanying text.
249. Pursuant to Badoni, future plaintiffs challenging NPS accommodation need
only prove that the agency's efforts deprived them "of their normal use of an area."
See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980).
250. The Rainbow Bridge controversy could be such a case where reasonable
government actions designed to accommodate free exercise of religion violate the
Establishment Clause.
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D. Voluntary Bans and Rainbow Bridge: Recreating the
Bear Lodge Conflict
1. Rainbow Bridge: The Bear Lodge Conflict Repackaged to
Resolve Whether a Voluntary Ban Is Unconstitutional
Tourism, recreation, resource extraction, and development
currently threaten more than forty-four Native American sacred
sites. 251 The controversy at one such site, Rainbow Bridge,
continues twenty-two years after the ruling in Badoni that the
NPS policy of allowing tourist access to the site did not violate
Native Americans' Free Exercise rights. The site continues to be
the subject of debate concerning federal land management agency
the Free
accommodation of Native American religious practices,
252
Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause.
In litigation commenced March 3, 2000, the MSLF filed a
complaint with the District Court for the District of Utah on behalf
253
of the Natural Arch and Bridge Society and individual visitors.
The complaint challenged NPS actions allegedly denying tourist
254
access to portions of the Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
Thus, while the NPS faced a challenge in 1980 from Native
Americans attempting to limit tourist access to the site, 255 the NPS
now faces a challenge from groups attempting to ensure expansive
tourist access to the site. The district court entered judgment on
April 9, 2002.256 The court dismissed the First Amendment claim
for failure to properly join defendants. 25 7 MSLF intends to appeal
this decision to the Tenth Circuit, thus keeping the First
258
Amendment issue alive.
Rainbow Bridge is a sandstone arch that rises 309 feet high
and spans 278 feet. 25 9 It is the largest freestanding natural stone
arch in the world. 260 The Bridge is located within the Rainbow
Bridge National Monument, a 160-acre area surrounded by a
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See Brady, supra note 2, at 175.
See MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUND., supra note 30.
See id.
See id.
See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980).

256. See UTAH DISTRICT

COURT,

CIVIL CASES

WITH RECENT JUDGMENTS,

http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/reports/judgment.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2002).
257. See Natural Arch and Bridge Soc'y v. Alston, No. 2:00 cv 191J (D. Utah Apr.
9, 2002), http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/reports/tifs/2_00cvOO191_00000044.tif.
258. See MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUND., supranote 30.

259. Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175.
260. See Smith & Manning, supra note 162.
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Navajo reservation. 261 The NPS administers the Monument. 262
Navajo Indians consider the Bridge one of the "incarnate forms of
Navajo gods";263 other Native Americans consider the Bridge to be
the doorway between life and death. 264 Navajo ceremonies
performed within the Monument's grounds predate the inundation
of Glen Canyon and the area near the Bridge caused by the
265
damming of the Colorado River.
Glen Canyon Dam on the Colorado River is fifty-eight miles
266
downstream from the Rainbow Bridge National Monument.
Prior to the construction of Glen Canyon Dam, which created Lake
Powell, very few tourists visited the Monument because of its
isolated location. 267 Lake Powell, however, now provides for easy
access to the Monument and the Bridge because tourists need only
reserve a place on federally-licensed tour boats that ferry visitors
to a docking area near the Bridge. 268 Private boat owners and
operators are also free to visit the Monument via Lake Powell.
diving off
The attractions at Rainbow Bridge include sunbathing,
269
the rocks into the lake, and walking under the Bridge.
Plaintiffs, the Natural Bridge and Arch Society, alleged that
the NPS prevents access to the Bridge, thereby denying tourists
the opportunity to walk under it.270 Plaintiffs alleged that the
NPS restricted their access to the Monument for the sake of one
particular religion. 27 1 NPS actions at Rainbow Bridge include
erecting barriers, posting signs requesting visitors not to walk
under the Bridge, and staffing roaming Park Service rangers to
explain the need to not walk under the Bridge.2 7 2 Plaintiffs
stressed that little agreement exists between the five tribes
negotiating with the NPS on Rainbow Bridge management about
Rainbow Bridge's exact cultural and religious significance to the

261. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175.
262. See id.
263. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 643 (D. Utah 1977).

264. See Brady, supra note 2, at 181 n.130.
265. See id.

266. See Badoni, 638 F.2d at 175.
267. See id.
268. See Badoni, 455 F. Supp at 642.

269. See Smith & Manning, supranote 162.
270. See Editorial, Keep Religious Neutrality, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 12, 2000, at
AA1, http://www.tribaccess.com.
271. See id.
272. See Smith & Manning, supra note 162 ("[T]he agency built a shin-high rock
wall in 1995 to discourage visitors from leaving the viewing area.").
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tribes.

273

2.

Applying the Bear Lodge Decisions to the Rainbow
Bridge Litigation

As with the Bear Lodge conflict, Native Americans at
Rainbow Bridge similarly argue that tourist practices desecrate
the sacred site and interfere with Native American religious and
cultural practices. 274 Similar to its actions at Devils Tower, the
NPS responded to the tribes' concerns in a collaborative fashion,
whereby the five involved tribes and the agency drafted a
memorandum of understanding and began consultation on the
agency's proposed activities within the Monument. 275 Negotiating
under a collaborative structure, the agency and the tribes achieved
positive results. For example, the agency considered paving the
access trail to the Bridge, but when the tribal coalition indicated
that paving the trail would block spirit passage between worlds,
276
the agency stabilized the path with a pine-based substance.
Further, at the tribes' urging, the NPS deleted from the Rainbow
Bridge informational pamphlet descriptions of the trails
underneath the Bridge so as not to encourage tourists to walk
277
under the Bridge.
These productive efforts, present both here and at Devils
Tower, ensure NPS compliance with President Clinton's 1994
Executive Order 13,007 to accommodate Native American
The Executive Order's
religious practices at sacred sites. 278
mandate to "avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of
such sacred sites" supports federal land management actions to
protect and preserve Native American religion and sacred sites on
public lands. 279 To effectuate such protection, the NPS elected to
undertake a collaborative approach and voluntary measures.
Although such actions were permissible at Bear Lodge and
Rainbow Bridge, an agency could unknowingly act to protect the
physical integrity of sacred sites in such a way that it crosses the
religious
permissible
and
impermissible
line
between

273. See id. The five tribes are the Navajos, San Juan Southern Paiutes, Kaibab
Paiutes, Hopis, and White Mesa Utes. See id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Executive Order).
279. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771, § 1(a) (May 24, 1996).
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accommodation. Exactly where this line is will likely be addressed
in future litigation.
The NPS's touchstone for its Rainbow Bridge National
Monument management structure is summarized in one word:
voluntary. 28 0 In 1998, after the district court in Bear Lodge found
voluntary efforts to accommodate Native American religious
practices constitutionally permissible, the NPS adopted a similar
management structure at Rainbow Bridge. NPS added the word
"voluntary" to signs located near the Bridge requesting that
tourists respect the Bridge as a Native American sacred site and
refrain from approaching or walking underneath it.281 In addition,
the NPS prudently stresses that its management actions and
efforts designed to accommodate Native American religious
practices at the Bridge are purely voluntary in nature. 28 2 The
Monument's supervisor, Joe Alston, likewise notes, "[ilt is
absolutely not illegal for you to walk under Rainbow Bridge ....
A ranger might ask you if you noticed the sign, but you will not be
28 3
stopped."
The similarities in management structure between Devils
Tower and Rainbow Bridge significantly increase the likelihood
that the Tenth Circuit will address the unanswered question of the
Bear Lodge litigation. The court must look at whether the NPS's
management plans and actions at Rainbow Bridge are "a policy
that has been carefully crafted to balance the competing needs of
individuals using [the Monument] while, at the same time,
That substantive
obeying the edicts of the Constitution."28 4
question exists against a backdrop of legal uncertainty because the
Tenth Circuit in Bear Lodge refused, on standing grounds, to
decide if the NPS climbing management plan established a
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause or if the NPS
climbing management plan was an appropriate exercise of agency
discretion necessary to satisfy the Free Exercise Clause. 28 5
Moreover, it is unclear whether the relatively recent agency trend
in management plans toward voluntary compliance provisions,
like those at issue at Devils Tower and Rainbow Bridge, will
280. This approach is similar to the FCMP implemented at Devils Tower. See
supra note 190 and accompanying text.
281. See Brady, supra note 2, at 182.
282. See id.
283. See Smith & Manning, supra note 162.
284. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1456-57 (D.
Wyo. 1998).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 227-233.
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survive the scrutiny of a Badoni analysis, where even a voluntary
plan otherwise permissible may alter normal non-Native American
286
use of public lands.
3.

Badoni Versus Bear Lodge: Determining the Potential
Disposition of Rainbow Bridge and Future
Controversies

The substantive legal question of federal land management
agency accommodation of Native American religious practices at
sacred sites on public lands is certain to arise in additional
circuits, given that federal land management agencies administer
more than 700 million acres. 287 When that question arises,
judicial recognition and application of the Tenth Circuit's Badoni
test may result in a determination that even voluntary federal
land management agency accommodation efforts violate the First
Amendment because they "deprive the public of its normal use of
an area."288 Other voluntary measures, however, could fall on the
constitutionally permissible side of the judicially-created line
because they strike an appropriate balance between the First
Amendment's counter-poised directives.
In such a controversy, the issue will evolve into arguments
over where that First Amendment line lies. Rainbow Bridge and
future controversies in the Tenth Circuit pit the Badoni decision
against the more recent Bear Lodge district court decision
upholding voluntary and carefully crafted land management
plans. To the extent other circuits may look to the Tenth Circuit
for guidance, courts can clearly uphold the NPS's efforts to
accommodate Native American religious practices as long as those
efforts are constitutionally permissible exercises of agency
Ultimately,
Bear Lodge proves this possibility.
discretion.
and
religious
what
to
determine
however, it is impossible
such
a
When
reflect.
will
balancing
a
judicial
recreational values
in
grant
review
should
Court
determination is made, the Supreme
order to bring finality to this controversial issue.

286. See supra text accompanying notes 221-225.
287. See Hooker, supra note 52, at 136 (stating that Congress has plenary power
to oversee federal lands, which amount to 732 million acres).
288. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980).
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V. Competitive Exclusion and Discovery: The Battle to
Protect Sacred Lands and Religious Freedom
Despite the possibility of successful litigation, Native
Americans at Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and other sacred
sites will still likely lose their battle to protect sacred sites and
The principle of
religious practices on those public lands.
competitive exclusion and the doctrine of discovery predict that,
realistically, Native Americans will ultimately lose this battle.
A. The Competitive Exclusion Principle
Federal land management agencies administer over 700
million acres of public lands. 289 On those public lands, conflicts
often develop between older, more established user groups and
new, emerging user groups. 290 Managing recreation on public
lands is now a primary goal for federal land management agencies
like the National Park Service. 291 As recreation on public lands
increases, specialized recreational sub-groups are also likely to
For example, the
grow in number and user intensity. 292
documented increase of rock climbing at Devils Tower National
Monument indicates that climbing will greatly influence all future
public lands management decisions, plans, and actions at the
Monument. Moreover, newly influential user groups will actively
293
advocate for their "fair share" of public lands.
The ecological principle of competitive exclusion states that
when two user groups compete for one scarce resource, ideological
conflict will arise, and each group will attempt to exclude the
other's access to that resource. 294 The Devils Tower National
Monument serves as a case study for this principle. At Devils
295
Tower, two groups perceive one resource drastically differently.
The fundamental and ideological difference between Native
Americans and climbers concerns the appropriate uses of the
289. See Hooker, supra note 52, at 136.
290. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 22, at 22 n.67 (explaining growth of
rock climbing).
291. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 209.
292. See id. at 209-10 (referring specifically to climbing as a recreational sport).
293. See Blumm, supra note 124, at 407-08.
294. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 59.
The NPS clearly
295. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 211-12.
understood this potential for conflict between climbers, who appreciate the Tower
as a premier climbing site, and Native Americans, who appreciate the area as a
sacred site. See id. The starkly differing cultural views resulted in a NPS
management approach geared toward conflict resolution. See id.
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Tower: the climbers want to climb it and the Native Americans
object. Representatives of the Bear Lodge Native American
296
community argue that climbers should not climb the Tower.
Meanwhile, representatives of the Tower's climbing community
stress that, despite their knowledge of Native American's beliefs,
the Tower is public property, and therefore they have a "right" to

climb it.297
The competitive exclusion principle fails to acknowledge the
possibility that collaboration or compromise efforts can provide for
multiple uses of scarce resources. 298 When ideological differences
exist within a conflict, collaborative efforts are less likely to
succeed. 299 Thus, competing user groups will not compromise,
thereby causing the conflict resolution process to dissolve and
fulfill the principle's prediction that the competing groups must
struggle to exclude each other's access or be excluded
themselves. 300 Despite the NPS program designed to promote a
collaborative result at Devils Tower, ideological conflicts remain
between Native Americans and climbers regarding use of the
30
Tower. 1
According to the Wyoming district court, the Devils Tower
FCMP struck an appropriate balance between the two user
groups.3 02 Yet, from either side's perspective, one user group still
pushed to exclude the other's access before, during, and after the

296. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 57-58.
297. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 213.
298. See id. at 215 ("All compromise can be viewed as an assessment of mutual
loss and gain. One party is often willing to alter an original position if they
perceive that their adversary is also willing to adjust their original demands.").
299. See id. at 216. Collaboration becomes more difficult "when the parties are
separated not only by negotiating positions, but also by different cultural heritage."
Id.
300. See id. at 215-16. Progress via collaboration is based on what gains a group
sees as attainable through compromise. See id. Ideological beliefs often restrict a
group's interest in comprise. The competitive exclusion principle is particularly
applicable to situations where a group desires to protect an ideological belief or the
physical manifestation of that belief (e.g., a sacred site).
301. See id. at 202 (concluding that "the two cultures perceptually construct the
landmark in two very different ways: as a natural cathedral through one cultural
lens, and as a geologic curiosity and rock climber's playground through the other").
Some climbers choose to climb with full knowledge of the tribal position. See supra
note 176 and accompanying text.
302. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1456-57 (D.
Wyo. 1998) (concluding that because the voluntary ban on both commercial and
recreational climbing balanced competing user group needs without violating the
Establishment Clause "the plan constitut[ed] a legitimate exercise of the Secretary
of the Interior's discretion in managing the monument").
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Bear Lodge litigation. The ecological principle of competitive
exclusion, therefore, predicts that, despite federal land
management agency efforts and judicial decisions upholding
carefully-designed agency management plans, conflict will
continue to emerge.
Devil's Tower and Rainbow Bridge are not the first examples
of competitive exclusion at work. In the late 1970s and early
1980s, members of the Cherokee Nation challenged the Tennessee
Valley Authority's (TVA) construction of Tellico Dam. 303 Tribal
30 4
members argued the dam would inundate sacred ground.
There, the two groups' desired uses of the land were mutually
incompatible. In its decision, the Sixth Circuit determined that
"[n]o law [was] to stand in the way of the completion and operation
of the dam." 305 Therefore, in a clear instance of the competitive
exclusion principle, the dominant culture-expressed through the
TVA-successfully excluded the Cherokee Nation from the scarce
resource of the Little Tennessee Valley. 306 Similarly, looking at
other cases through the lens of this principle, the dominant culture
has excluded Native American interests in public lands or waters
308
and mining. 309
for oil,307 expansion of ski areas,
The competitive exclusion principle, of course, is not a
judicially-created principle. Nevertheless, as the principle reflects
one group's dominance over another, the courts may be considered
an extension of cultural conquest applied to Native American
religious freedom on public lands. 310 Courts reviewing conflicts
303. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); Linge,
supra note 131, at 321.
304. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
305. Id. at 1161. The Tellico Dam case is better known as the Snail Darter Case,
which resulted in the Supreme Court's landmark Endangered Species Act decision.
See Linge, supra note 131, at 321.
306. See Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160-65.
307. See, e.g., Inupiat Cmty. of the Arctic Slope v. United States, 548 F. Supp.
182 (D. Ala. 1982), affd, 746 F.2d 570 (9th Cir. 1984); see Linge, supra note 131, at
327.
308. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see Linge, supra
note 131, at 328.
309. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D.
Ariz. 1990), affd sub norn. Havasupai Tribe v. Robertson, 943 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.
1991); see Linge, supra note 131, at 335.
310. See Larry Sager, Rediscovering America: Recognizing the Sovereignty of
Native American Indian Nations, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 745, 752 (1999)
(concluding that "It]he courts of the United States have justified the forcible taking
of land and exploitation of resources from American Indians using culturally-biased
rhetoric, culturally relativistic slogans, and biased theoretical models based on
Natural Law; the Doctrine of Discovery, Social Darwinism, or Manifest Destiny").
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where the competitive exclusion principle is at play are not the
courts of Native Americans, but instead the "courts of the
conqueror." 311 Devils Tower and Rainbow Bridge are clear
examples of the competitive exclusion principle because they
evidence the characteristics of ideological conflict, competing user
312
groups, and scarce resources.
B. The Doctrine of Discovery
The doctrine of discovery is well summarized by the judicial
Essentially a
pronouncement that "might makes right."313
validation of conquest, this justification has been U.S. law for 179
years, beginning with the 1823 decision in Johnson v. McIntosh.314
The doctrine of discovery was introduced into U.S. law in a
trilogy of Supreme Court opinions authored by Chief Justice John
Marshall, which effectively excluded Native Americans from their
land and forbade their participation in the political process. 315 In
Johnson v.McIntosh, Chief Justice Marshall determined that the
U.S. government gained title to Native American lands through its
Marshall noted that this
"discovery" of North America. 316
discovery and "title by conquest" process relied on force. 31 7 In
other words, the "entry of the white man" extinguished all Native
American proprietary land interests and claims. 31 8 Marshall's
decision simultaneously facilitated and justified the colonization of
319
America.
311. Id. at 750.
312. When such conflict exists and collaborative efforts cannot remedy
ideological conflict, the doctrine of discovery predicts that Native Americans will be
the group excluded from access to scarce resources found on public lands.
313. See Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at 219 (tracing the origin of the
doctrine of discovery to Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), and
noting that in Johnson, "the otherwise eminent jurist [Chief Justice Marshall]
came closer than perhaps at any other time in his thirty years of administering
justice to simply declaring that might makes right").
314. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543 (1823).
315. See id.; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (holding that
the Cherokee Nation was not considered a foreign state and thus did not have
standing to sue in U.S. courts); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)
(holding that treaties between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. government can
be overridden by subsequent unilateral government action).
316. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589.
317. Id.
318. Badoni v. Higginson, 455 F. Supp. 641, 644 (D. Utah 1977) C'Any aboriginal
proprietary interest that the Navajos may have had in this land would have been
extinguished by the entry of the white man in earlier years." (citing Northwestern
Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 339 (1945))).
319. See WILLIAMS, supro note 35, at 8.
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Marshall further diminished the status of Native Americans
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia by announcing that Native
American tribes were "domestic dependent nations," essentially
"ward[s]" of the United States. 320 One year later, he cemented
this structure of dominance in Worcester v. Georgia, writing that
"power, war, conquest give rights, which after possession, are
conceded by the world; and which can never be controverted by
those on whom they descend." 321 With the doctrine of discovery
thus manifested in a rule of law, the U.S. government acquired
and settled the land from sea to sea "in perfect good faith" that all
of its historically varying and sometimes inconsistent Native
322
American policies satisfied the law.
The doctrine of discovery is not limited solely to land
conquest. The U.S. government relied on the doctrine's theoretical
basis for other programs and policies that suppressed Native
American culture, including discouragement of religious practices,
forced assimilation, and consistent disregard of Indian treaty
rights. 323 In this sense, the doctrine of discovery in U.S. history
324
indicates that law provides the power to empire.
C. Combining the Doctrines: Excluding Native Americans
Once and for All
The ecological principle of competitive exclusion suggests
that the dominant culture will prevail in resource struggles. 325
History, interpreted through the doctrine of discovery, reveals that
Native Americans are the excluded group. The dominant culture
is non-Native American, and Native Americans in turn are subject
to that culture's courts-the "courts of the conqueror." Issues
concerning both the competitive exclusion principle and the
doctrine of discovery exist today. For example, the Devils Tower
and Rainbow Bridge conflicts are clear cases in which two groups
fight to exclude each other from use of a single scarce resource. In
addition, in 1998 the U.S. Court of Federal Claims determined
that Native Americans have no original interest in certain land
320. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17; see also Burton & Ruppert, supra note 5, at
219-20.
321. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543.
322. WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 325.
323. See id. at 325-26.
324. See id. Williams further notes that "[t]he history of the American Indian in
Western legal thought reveals that a will to empire proceeds most effectively under
a rule of law." Id. at 325.
325. See Hanson & Moore, supra note 1, at 59.
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326
because they lost title when conquered.
American development and expansion pushed aside Native
Americans and their tribes. 327 George Washington, as the nation's
Commander-in-Chief, remarked that settlement would "as
certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire."328 This same
theme of victory through settlement underscores the debate over
public lands management and Native American religious practices
at sacred sites located on public lands. Conflict over public lands
management for Native American sacred sites and religious
practices will increase because recreational use of public lands is
increasing. 329 The sheer number of recreationalists could silence
330
the Native American voices advocating for protection.
Competitive exclusion and the doctrine of discovery do not
impede judicial or legislative progress toward protection of Native
American religious freedom on public lands. Rather, the principle
and the doctrine prevent progress from occurring at all. Status as
the conqueror, coupled with an approach to conflict resolution for
which the frame-of-reference is cultural superiority, produces a
subjective body of law and policy. President Theodore Roosevelt
once remarked that "[pleace has come through the last century to
large sections of the earth because the civilized races have spread
over the earth's dark places." 331 When the conqueror determines
who is civilized and what places are dark, the non-dominant

326. See Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 468, 476 (Ct. Fed. Cl.
1998). Ruling on whether the Yurok Tribe of California established a compensable
expectancy in land to establish a Fifth Amendment takings claim, the court noted
that "aboriginal title may be terminated by the sovereign without any legally
[It] constitutes no more than
enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians ....
permissive title, which is vulnerable to affirmative action by the sovereign, which
possess[es) exclusive power to extinguish the right of occupancy at will." Id. at 476
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The dominant culture's right to
extinguish Native American land interest is supreme, "whether it be done by
treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to
the right of occupancy, or otherwise." Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F.
Supp. 1471, 1478 (D. Ariz. 1990).
327. See WILLIAMS, supra note 35, at 325.
328. Letter from George Washington, U.S. Commander-in-Chief, to James
Duane, head of the Continental Congress' Committee of Indian Affairs (Sept. 7,
1783), reprinted in GETCHES ET AL., supra note 35, at 84-85.
329. For example, 300,000 tourists a year visit Rainbow Bridge National
Monument. See Editorial, Keep Religious Neutrality, supra note 270.
330. At Rainbow Bridge, for example, five tribes stand against a potential pool of
300,000 tourists. See supra note 329 and accompanying text; see also Smith &
Manning, supra note 162 (discussing the five tribes' attempt to restrict tourist
traffic at Rainbow Bridge).
331. Sager, supra note 310, at 750 (citing HOWARD K. BEALE, THEODORE
ROOSEVELT AND THE RISE OF AMERICA TO WORLD POWER 72 (1956)).
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culture faces an uphill battle. In the end, Native American
success in achieving change will likely continue to depend on the
law and the dominant culture's capacity to abandon the doctrine of
discovery and minimize the impact of competitive exclusion.
D. Possible Solutions to Overcome the Negative Impact of
Competitive Exclusion and Discovery
Despite competitive exclusion and the doctrine of discovery,
legislative, judicial, and executive means exist to further the
resolution of the current and future conflicts between Native
Americans and other resource user groups over sacred sites on
public lands. Congress could establish legislation designed to
clarify the appropriate balance between competing applications of
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause to land
management. After all, it has plenary authority over public
lands. 332 In the alternative, Congress could enact legislation to
protect Native American free exercise of religion on public lands
under its enforcement powers and the Fourteenth Amendment's
fundamental liberty concept, so long as it is appropriately
tailored. 333 Congress also has the authority to establish legislation
specific to a sacred site. 334 For example, when it established the El
Malpais National Monument in New Mexico in 1987, Congress
granted the Secretary of Interior the authority to respond to tribal
3 35
requests with temporary closure of sacred sites to public access.
Moreover, Congress could create a general statute for sacred sites
based on the El Malpais model. 336 To date, however, Congress'
337
legislative action in this field is glaringly lacking.
As for the judiciary, great care should be given whenever the
issues of Native American religious freedom and sacred site
protection on public lands are presented for review. The Bear
Lodge district court decision indicates that the nuances of
balancing between the religion clauses may produce flawed
analysis. 338 Further, courts could become more receptive to

332. See supra note 89.
333. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517-19, 529-36 (1997).
334. See Hooker, supra note 52, at 134.
335. Id.
336. See Grimm, supra note 49, at 24.
337. See id. at 23 ("Congress has never enacted a general sacred lands protection
statute.").
338. See supra Part IV.A.
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treating land as a sacred being for Free Exercise purposes 339 or
more receptive in general to expansion of existing Indian law
doctrines like the trust doctrine.3 40 In Establishment cases, courts
341
should act to narrow the field of potentially applicable tests.
Finally, when conflicts between the religion clauses arise in an
apparently irreconcilable way, courts342should rule on the side of
free exercise over anti-establishment.
The most hope for change, however, rests with the federal
land management agencies. Federal land management agencies
should implement responsible, proactive, and collaborative efforts
to facilitate competing user groups, as was done at Devils Tower.
Certainly the law, as well as legislative and judicial impact on the
law, holds great potential for the future of Native American
religious freedom and sacred site protection on public lands.
Nevertheless, it is land management agencies that are best placed
to promote objective discourse on cultural and social beliefs as to
public lands. Ideological differences, which are at the core of the
exclusion principle, may be diffused through open, reasoned, and
collaborative processes. When the land management agency is
faced with competing user groups with strong value differences, a
collaborative process allows each side to see the other's point of
view.3 43 Through this process, lasting change may occur. Finally,
as Bear Lodge shows, collaborative processes that produce a
voluntary-based land management effort are more likely to pass
344
constitutional scrutiny.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, Native American tribes across the United
States are exerting more authority and receiving more recognition
from federal and state governments in return. This recognition
means that the visibility of Native American affairs and Indian
law issues will increase in the public arena. However, faith that
such power and recognition will be able to effect change overlooks
the realistic lessons that American Indian history teaches.
345
The idea of "government by the people, for the people"
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.

See Ward, supranote 68, at 797.
See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
See TRIBE, supra note 14, at 1201.
See Burton and Ruppert, supra note 5, at 211-12.
See supra Part IV.A.
Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in HENRY J.
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presupposes adequate representation of 'a people' as a member of
the collective whole. In the context of Native American religious
freedom on public lands, the table is seemingly tilted in favor of
the dominant culture. The competitive exclusion principle and the
doctrine of discovery are crucial to understanding this imbalance,
because the matter is largely about conflict on public lands pitting
the interests of dominant culture of new and expanding user
groups, such as recreationalists, against Native American
religious practice and sacred site protection.
Sadly, the competitive exclusion principle and the doctrine of
discovery could operate to diminish much of the gains Native
Americans achieve in the courts and the legislature. The status
quo, although perhaps changing, continues to reflect the fact that
American culture and America's legal policy of "might makes
right" in Native American affairs works to curtail, if not defeat,
reasonably tailored federal land management agency efforts
designed to protect Native American religious practices at sacred
sites on public lands. This real world cause-and-effect dynamic is
particularly shameful when compared to Chief Seattle's words:
"Every part of this soil is sacred in the estimation of my people.
Every hillside, every valley, every plain and grove, has been
hallowed by some sad or happy event in days long vanished."346
Changing this dynamic certainly involves the law. But, perhaps
more importantly, change also requires persuasive and objective
discourse aimed at cultural and societal beliefs and value systems.
This focus is all the more important if voluntary bans by federal
land management agencies to preserve sacred sites and protect
Native American religious freedom are the standard for
constitutionally permissible agency action.

RAYMOND, THE LIFE, PUBLIC SERVICES AND STATE PAPERS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN,

211-12 (1865).
346. Dean B. Suagee, American Indian Religious Freedom and Cultural
Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 1 (1983) (citing Chief Seattle, Statement Upon Signing the Treaty at
Medicine Creek (1854)).
There is an ongoing discussion as to whether Chief Seattle actually made this
speech. For further insight, see Jerry L. Clark, Thus Spoke Chief Seattle: The Story
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